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“Plaintiff could not fairly have been charged with notice of facts 
which he could have learned only out of the mouths of the 
conspirators, who were successfully endeavoring to conceal 
them.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 23, 2013, California Senate Bill 538 became law, 
conforming the anti-fraud provision of California securities law to 
Rule 10b-5, the federal anti-fraud provision promulgated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).2  If courts interpret 
the amended California law consistently with federal courts’ 
interpretations of the now virtually identical Rule 10b-5, securities 
fraud victims will face new, onerous “pleading hurdle[s].”3  Plaintiffs 
1. Sime v. Malouf, 212 P.2d 946, 960-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949). 
2. S.B. 538, 2013 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), 2013 Cal. Stat. ch. 335.  The bill 
“[e]nsures consistency with federal law by updating anti-fraud provisions in the 
Securities law.”  S.B. 538 Bill Analysis, Assemb. Comm. on Banking and Fin. (June 
10, 2013), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0501-0550/sb_538_ 
cfa_20130607_121212_asm_comm.html.  As amended, section 25401 of the 
California Corporations Code reads: 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or 
purchase of a security, directly or indirectly, to do any of the following: 
(a) Employ a devise, scheme, or artifice to defraud.  (b) Make an untrue 
statement of material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to 
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading.  (c) Engage in an act, practice, or course of 
business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon another 
person.   
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25401 (West 2014).  Rule 10b-5 reads:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course 
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, with the purchase or sale of any security.   
SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014).   
3. Michael Mugmon et al., United States: California Overhauls State Anti-
Securities Fraud Statute, MONDAQ (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/ 
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suing under Rule 10b-5 would then need to plead and prove the 
judicially-imposed elements—scienter, reliance, and causation—
which have never before been required under the anti-fraud provision 
of California securities law.4  For that reason, the time is ripe for 
courts to reject the particularly harsh statute of limitations governing 
California’s anti-fraud provisions. 
Even under the previous version of California’s anti-fraud 
provision,5 which relieved plaintiffs of pleading these elements,6 the 
statute of limitations posed a dilemma for aggrieved investors.  The 
statute of limitations for securities fraud under California law begins 
to run when the plaintiff discovers “the facts constituting the 
violation,”7 but courts can impute “discovery” to plaintiffs before they 
even realize they have been defrauded.8  This judicial practice can rob 
securities fraud victims of any chance of recovery and give a complete 
defense to defendants who succeed in concealing their fraud because 
unitedstates/x/267150/Securities/California+Overhauls+AntiSecurities+Fraud+Statu
te.   
4. Ethan Brown, California Amends Its State Securities Fraud Provision, 
ETHAN BROWN LAW (Oct. 7, 2013), http://ethanbrownlawblog.com/california-
amends-its-state-securities-fraud-provision/.   
5. Before it was amended by S.B. 538, see supra note 2, section 25401 of the 
California Corporations Code read:  
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell a security in this state or buy 
or offer to buy a security in this state by means of any written or oral 
communication which includes an untrue statement of material fact or 
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading.  
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25401 (West 2014). 
6. Bowden v. Robinson, 136 Cal. Rptr. 871, 878 (Ct. App. 1977).  Though a 
plaintiff need not plead reliance, causation, or intent, section 25401 is not a strict 
liability violation.  A defendant is afforded a complete defense if he can: “(1) prove 
that he exercised reasonable care and did not know of the untruth or omission, (2) 
show that even if he had exercised reasonable care, he would not have known of the 
untruth or omission, and (3) show that the plaintiff knew the facts concerning the 
untruth or omission.”  Id.  
7. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506(b) (West 2014) (requiring that actions be 
brought no later than “two years after the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts 
constituting the violation”). 
8. See discussion infra Parts III.D, IV.D.1. 
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the limitations period may expire long before the would-be plaintiff 
has gathered enough facts to file a viable complaint.9 
The rule that allows this unjust outcome is called “inquiry 
notice.”10  Inquiry notice imposes a duty of inquiry upon a victim of 
fraud, which arises as soon as facts are available to the victim 
suggestive of the possibility of fraud.11  When circumstances arise 
which suggest to an investor of ordinary intelligence that he may have 
been defrauded,12 and the investor “makes no inquiry,” knowledge of 
the fraud is imputed to the investor as of the date the duty arose.13  If 
the investor does investigate, the investor will be charged with 
knowledge of the fraud as of the date the investor, exercising 
reasonable diligence, would have discovered the fraud.14  Therefore, 
inquiry notice may trigger the limitations period before the investor 
actually knows he or she has been defrauded.15  Even where the 
investor suspects fraud and diligently investigates, the limitations 
period may expire before the investor can gather enough facts to draft 
a viable complaint because plaintiffs must meet heightened pleading 
standards for fraud.16 
9. See discussion infra Part IV.D. 
10. See Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 815 (Ct. App. 2006). 
11. Deveny, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 822 (“[O]nce placed on inquiry notice by 
storm warnings, an investor must perform a reasonable investigation into the 
possibility of fraud.”). 
12. “Such circumstances are often [called] ‘storm warnings.’”  Dodds v. Cigna 
Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 
685, 697 (1st Cir. 1978)). 
13. Id.; see, e.g., Wright v. Bloom, No. C 12-00746, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
170679 WHA, at *8-10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012) (dismissing complaint as four 
months too late because inquiry notice triggered the running of the limitations period 
when plaintiffs first became aware of fraudulent conduct). 
14. Deveny, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 822 (citing Berry v. Valence Technology, Inc. 
175 F.3d 669, 704, 706 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
15. See, e.g., Wright, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170679, at *9-10 (finding that 
under inquiry notice, limitations period began to run before plaintiffs even knew 
they had participated in a securities offering). 
16. See Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 199, 210 (Ct. App. 2007) (“Fraud allegations must be pled with more detail 
than other causes of action.  The facts constituting the fraud, including every 
element of the cause of action, must be alleged ‘factually and specifically.’” 
(quoting Comm. on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 
660, 672 (Cal. 1983))). 
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Given the likelihood that courts will impose even more exacting 
pleading requirements on securities fraud victims suing under 
California’s amended anti-fraud provisions, California should reject 
inquiry notice.17  Instead, the statute of limitations for securities fraud 
should accrue upon discovery of facts constituting each element of the 
violation.  This would provide investors with time to investigate the 
fraud, gather facts supporting each element of their claim, and plead 
with the particularity required for a fraud claim  Not only is this 
interpretation of the statute of limitations consistent with the plain 
meaning of the text of the statute, it is also consistent with the 
apparent legislative intent.18 
Part II of this note provides background on securities fraud and 
the purpose and policies behind statutes of limitations, particularly as 
statutes of limitations apply to private rights of action for securities 
fraud.  Part III describes anti-fraud provisions in securities law 
including private rights of action under both California and federal 
securities law, as well as their respective statutes of limitations.  This 
part highlights the inconsistencies between the purposes of private 
enforcement of securities laws, the policies purportedly served by 
statutes of limitations, and inquiry notice.  Part IV recommends that 
California reject inquiry notice in favor of a discovery-based standard.  
The plain language of the statute of limitations supports a discovery-
based standard, and the Supreme Court has rejected inquiry notice for 
securities fraud claims under nearly identical federal law.19  More 
importantly, inquiry notice unfairly rewards fraudsters for concealing 
17. Whether courts will require plaintiffs to plead the judicially-imposed 
elements of Rule 10b-5 to sustain a claim under California state securities law 
remains to be seen.  Former Commissioner of the Department of Corporations (now 
the Department of Business Oversight) Keith Bishop opined, “It will probably be a 
very long time until the courts will untangle the Gordian knot tied by the legislature 
when it enacted SB 538.”  Keith Bishop, California Creates Complete Chaos By 
Rewriting Anti-Fraud Statute, But “We Are Against Fraud Aren’t We?”, 
CALIFORNIA CORP. L. BLOG (Sept. 24, 2013), 
http://calcorporatelaw.com/2013/09/california-creates-complete-chaos-by-rewriting-
anti-fraud-statute-but-we-are-against-fraud-arent-we/.  Even if the amendment does 
not create a higher pleading standard, inquiry notice should be rejected for reasons 
set forth in Part IV.D, infra. 
18. See discussion infra Part IV.C-D. 
19. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 653 (2010). 
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their schemes and undermines the purposes of private enforcement—
detering of fraud and providing restitution for victims. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Securities Fraud 
The term “security” includes “the commonly known documents 
traded for speculation or investment.”20  But securities are more than 
just stocks and bonds.  Securities also include “investment contracts,” 
a broad term encompassing a wide array of schemes through which 
individuals are led to invest money “in a common enterprise with 
profits to come solely from the efforts of others.”21  This flexible 
judicial definition of investment contract acknowledges the “countless 
and variable schemes” devised by innovative “promoters” to trick 
individuals into parting with money.22 
Indeed, securities fraud takes many forms.  In California, spikes in 
oil prices have triggered increases in fraudulent oil-related investment 
offerings.23  Another form of securities fraud in California is the 
“prime bank scheme,” in which investors are induced to pool their 
money with other investors’ money by the promise of high returns 
from offshore banks which normally limit their services to the super-
rich.24  Due to recent rule changes that the SEC has promulgated 
pursuant to the JOBS Act,25 states, as the primary regulators of 
securities registration, will likely face a new wave of fraudulent 
schemes carried out under the pretense of a private placement 
exemption from registration.26  The SEC recently lifted the 80-year 
20. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946). 
21. Id. at 301. 
22. Id. at 299. 
23. STATE OF CAL. DEP’T. OF CORPORATIONS, LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDE TO 
THE CORPORATE SECURITIES LAW (2006), available at 
http://www.dbo.ca.gov/Licensees/Corporate_Securities_Law/pdf/doc37.pdf. 
24. Id. 
25. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 
(2012). 
26. See A. HEATH ABSHURE, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, NASAA COMMENTS 
IN RESPONSE TO RELEASE NO. 33-9354 (FILE NO. S7-07-12), “ELIMINATING THE 
PROHIBITION AGAINST GENERAL SOLICITATION AND GENERAL ADVERTISING IN 
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ban on general solicitations for private securities offerings.27  
Fraudsters can now take advantage of this lift on consumer protection 
by marketing their schemes through social media and other forms of 
advertising to unsophisticated, inexperienced investors, which will 
certainly lead to an increase in securities fraud.28 
The anticipated increase in securities fraud warrants a re-
examination of the state securities laws because “[s]ecurities fraud 
produces . . . social costs that may justify regulation.”29  “First, fraud 
increases the cost of capital” because investors who “fear that issuers 
will defraud them . . . discount the price they are willing to pay for 
securities,” and may even shy away from securities markets 
altogether.30  Second, securities fraud “upset[s] the efficient allocation 
of resources” because stock will not be valued correctly.31  It follows 
that an “effective deterrence regime . . . reduce[s] these social costs” 
by “bring[ing] skittish investors back” to securities markets and 
improving the allocation of resources.32 
Securities laws provide for private rights of action because private 
enforcement supplements enforcement efforts by regulatory bodies, 
allows aggrieved investors to recover money lost in fraudulent 
investment schemes, and helps ensure the integrity of the securities 
RULE 506 AND RULE 144A” 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-12/s70712-92.pdf. 
27. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General 
Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-
9415 (July 10, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/33-9415.pdf. 
28. Top Investor Threats, NORTH AMERICAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.nasaa.org/3752/top-investor-threats/ (last visited Nov. 25, 
2013). 
29. Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud 
Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2179 (2010). 
30. Id.  Rose explains how securities fraud increases the cost of capital, not 
only with respect to primary offerings, but also on the secondary market. 
31. Id.  “If fraud is rampant, investors may be unable to distinguish between 
good and bad firms and may therefore pay too little for securities of the former and 
too much for securities of the latter.  As a result, ‘companies whose stock is 
overvalued may raise too much equity and overinvest.  On the other hand, 
companies whose stock is undervalued may find it costly or impracticable to obtain 
sufficient capital from alternative sources, and thus underinvest.’”  Id. (quoting 
Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 
41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1010 (1992)). 
32. Id. at 2180. 
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markets.33  Courts have acknowledged the important role of “private 
litigation in enforcing ethical corporate behavior and obtaining 
restitution for harmed investors,”34 and have recognized an implied 
private right of action under Rule 10b-5 for over forty years.35  
Between 1998 and 2003, private enforcers recovered nearly four times 
more in investor losses than the SEC.36 
B. Policies Served by Statutes of Limitations 
A statute of limitations requires that claims be brought within a 
prescribed period of time after a cause of action arises and serves as a 
complete bar to claims that are not brought within that time limit.37  
The purpose of statutes of limitations is twofold: to encourage 
plaintiffs to bring suit before “evidence of meritorious claims . . .  
become[s] stale” and to provide certainty for potential defendants that 
after a certain period of time, they will not be sued.38  Limitation 
periods, then, are premised on the theory that “at some point, the 
[interest in limiting stale claims and relieving potential defendants of 
uncertainty] prevails over the right of a plaintiff to bring its claim.”39 
In the context of securities fraud, additional considerations inform 
statutes of limitations.  Corporate issuers of securities are often the 
defendants in securities fraud litigation,40 and a company that is 
“distracted by the threat of litigation” is “less likely to devote 
33. Id. at 2174; Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Toward a Just 
Measure of Repose: The Statute of Limitations for Securities Fraud, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1547, 1555 (2011). 
34. Nishal Ray Ramphal, The Role of Public and Private Litigation in the 
Enforcement of Securities Laws in the United States, RAND CORP. 13 (2007). 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2007/RAND_RGSD2
24.pdf . 
35. Elizabeth Cosenza, Dura-tion: A New Paradigm for Construing the Statute 
of Limitations in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 691 n.49 
(2010). 
36. Ramphal, supra note 34, at 22. 
37. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 2 (2000). 
38. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 1551. 
39. Cosenza, supra note 35, at 686. 
40. Between 1998 and 2004, “84.2% of class action [securities fraud] 
defendants [were] public corporations.”  Ramphal, supra note 34, at 2-4. 
                                                          
8
California Western Law Review, Vol. 50 [2013], No. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol50/iss2/4
Guner.docx (Do Not Delete) 7/2/2014  12:42 PM 
2014] THE SECURITIES FRAUD VICTIM’S DILEMMA 295 
resources to productive purposes.”41  Moreover, defending class 
action securities fraud lawsuits is “costly,” not only to the defendant 
corporation but also to the public.42  Even in the wake of the most 
recent financial crisis, more than half of all American adults have 
money invested in the stock market,43 so securities fraud statutes of 
limitations must serve the additional interest of minimizing liability 
exposure for “large numbers of innocent [stockholders].”44 
On the other hand, the overall health of the economy depends, to a 
large extent, on the integrity of securities markets, which in turn 
depends on private enforcement to deter securities issuers from 
engaging in fraud.45  When investors lose money because of the 
“failure of regulatory authorities to detect [corporate] wrongdoing,” 
the “overall willingness of the public to invest” decreases, which 
“hinders the formation of capital.”46  This “lead[s] ultimately to lower 
levels of economic growth than could otherwise have been 
achieved.”47  Thus, the cost of private enforcement of securities laws 
to corporate defendants and the public “must be measured against the 
deterrence of fraud and the increase in public confidence in the 
securities market that more robust private securities litigation . . . has 
fostered.”48  Therefore, the role of private enforcement in the 
protection of investors, the efficiency of capital markets, and the 
41. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 1551. 
42. Ramphal, supra note 34, at 5.  Who ultimately bears the costs of securities 
litigation—the defendant corporation, its shareholders, or the public—is a “complex 
question.”  Id. at 100-01. 
43. Lydia Saad, U.S. Stock Ownership Stays at Record Low, GALLUP (May 8, 
2013), www.gallup.com/poll/162353/stock-ownership-stays-record-low.aspx. 
44. Cosenza, supra note 35, at 687. 
45. See Ramphal, supra note 34, at 13. 
46. Ramphal, supra note 34, at 1.  Ramphal also notes: 
[T]he link between private and public enforcement mechanisms has taken 
on added significance in recent years following the corporate scandals and 
bankruptcies at a host of leading companies, beginning with Enron in 
2001.  Regulatory authorities were roundly condemned for failing to 
detect the wrongdoing, and subsequently to obtain adequate investor 
restitution.   
Id. at 9. 
47. Id. at 1. 
48. Id. at 5. 
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health of the economy should not be undervalued, nor should it be 
thwarted by an overly obstructive statute of limitations. 
III. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT FOR SECURITIES FRAUD 
A. Private Rights of Action Under Federal Securities Laws 
“Federal [securities] regulation . . . emerged as part of the 
aftermath of the market crash in 1929.”49  The laws were “designed to 
provide investors with full disclosure of material information 
concerning [issuers of securities, and] to protect investors against 
fraud” and “manipulation of stock prices.”50  The Securities Act of 
1933 (“Securities Act”) requires that public securities offerings be 
registered and that investors be given a prospectus containing material 
information about the issuer and its offering.51  The Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) requires periodic disclosure 
of material information.52  It also created the SEC and provided it 
“with an arsenal of flexible enforcement powers.”53 
Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act creates liability for those 
who make a material misrepresentation in connection with the sale of 
securities.54 
Liability under [this provision] attaches if . . . (1) the defendant 
made a false or misleading statement of material fact or failed to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement not 
misleading; (2) the plaintiff did not know of the untruth or 
49. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976).  The stock market 
crash of 1929 led to the Great Depression, “the longest economic downturn in 
American history.”  U.S. SENATE HISTORICAL OFFICE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SENATE 
RESOLUTIONS 84 AND 239 (THE PECORA COMMITTEE), NOTABLE SENATE 
INVESTIGATIONS 1, available at www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/ 
common/investigations/pdf/Pecora_investigation_citations.pdf.  In 1932, Senate 
Resolution 84 authorized the Committee on Banking and Currency to investigate 
stock market practices.  Id.  Congress “rel[ied] heavily on the revelations” 
uncovered by the committee in drafting and passing the Securities Act of 1933 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Id. at 3. 
50. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195.  
51. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77l (2012). 
52. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2012). 
53. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195. 
54. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2012). 
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omission; and (3) the defendant knew, or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence could have known, of the untruth or 
omission.55 
Section 12(a)(2) differs from common law fraud in that reliance, 
causation, and scienter are not elements.56 
In 1942, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 pursuant to the power 
conferred by § 10 of the Exchange Act.57  Rule 10b-5 makes it 
unlawful for any person to make a material misrepresentation “‘in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.’”58  The rule was 
adopted “primarily [to] impos[e] . . . liability upon buyers of 
securities,” because the “scheme of civil liability in the Securities 
Act . . . applies only to an action [brought] by a buyer of securities 
against a seller.”59  However, a “spokesman for its drafters” 
“described [it] rightly as a ‘catchall’ clause . . . ‘to deal with new 
manipulative (or cunning) devices.’”60  Though Rule 10b-5 “does 
not . . . provide for an express civil remedy,” the courts have read into 
the rule an implied private right of action for victims of securities 
fraud.61  A plaintiff suing under Rule 10b-5 must prove elements that 
are similar to the elements of common law fraud: a false or misleading 
statement or omission of material information; reliance; causation; and 
scienter.62 
55. Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 693 (1st Cir. 1978) (citing Alton Box 
Board Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1977)). 
56. ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay Int’l Corp., 899 F. Supp. 1061, 
1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).  “The primary difference between a § 12(2) action and a 
fraud action is that in the former plaintiffs need not show scienter, reliance or loss 
causation.”  Id. 
57. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729 (1975); see 
also SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).  
58. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 729 (quoting SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-5). 
59. HAROLD MARSH, JR. & ROBERT H. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE 
CALIFORNIA CORPORATE SECURITIES LAW OF 1968, at 442 (1969). 
60. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976). 
61. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730. 
62. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 
376-77 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Once federal jurisdiction is established, a 
§ 10(b) plaintiff must prove elements that are similar to those in actions for 
common-law fraud.  Each requires proof of a false or misleading statement or 
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B. Private Rights of Action Under California Securities Laws 
California enacted its first comprehensive scheme of securities 
regulation in 1917.63  It lacked any civil remedy, except that a security 
issued without a permit could be deemed “void,” entitling the 
purchaser to restitution.64  The legislative scheme provided no remedy 
for a purchaser of securities in a transaction where the issuer was 
guilty of intentional fraud, so long as the issuer complied with the 
permit requirement.65 
The drafters of the Corporate Securities Law of 1968 were 
“concerned” with the lack of “adequate civil . . . remedies for 
defrauded investors.”66  Thus, the drafters “modeled” the new “civil 
liability provisions” upon those found in the federal Securities and 
Exchange Acts.67  Like § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, section 25401 
of the California Corporations Code68 prohibits material 
misrepresentation in connection with a security.  Like Rule 10b-5 of 
the Exchange Act, section 25401 imposes liability upon both buyer 
and seller.69  Unlike § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, only actual 
purchasers or sellers of the securities may be liable under section 
25401.70  Section 25504, however, extends liability to enumerated 
individuals who materially aid in the fraud, including officers, 
directors, and broker-dealers,71 and section 25504.1 extends liability 
material omission, reliance thereon, damages caused by the wrongdoing, and 
scienter on the part of the defendant.” (citations omitted)). 
63. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 59, at 4. 
64. Id. at 15-16. 
65. See id. at 16. 
66. Id. at 46. 
67. Id. at 436. 
68. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25401 (West 2014).  Hereinafter, all statutory 
references are to the California Corporations Code, unless otherwise noted. 
69. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 59, at 447. 
70. Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
199, 221 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that while a “seller” under § 12 of the Securities 
Act has been construed to include anyone who solicits the purchase or sale of a 
security, under section 25401 liability attaches only to the actual seller of the 
security). 
71. Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504 (West 
2014). 
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to any person who aids in the violation with the intent to deceive.72  
Thus, California’s anti-fraud provisions do not perfectly mirror the 
federal laws, but the civil liability created under each scheme is 
similar.  While section 25401 was originally modeled after § 12(a)(2) 
of the Securities Act, the California legislature has recently amended 
section 25401 so that it is now virtually identical to Rule 10b-5,73 
which was promulgated under the authority granted to the SEC by the 
Exchange Act. 
C. Statutes of Limitations for Private Rights of Action  
Under Federal Law 
The statute of limitations for § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act is 
governed by § 13 of the Securities Act, which requires that a plaintiff 
bring suit “within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement 
or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence.”74  The statute also provides an 
absolute three-year limit from the time of the violation.75 
Because the private right of action under Rule 10b-5 is a “judicial 
creation,” it has no express statute of limitations in the Exchange 
Act.76  Before 1991, the circuit courts disagreed about the appropriate 
statute of limitations; for instance, some “borrowed . . . from the 
closest analogous state-law cause of action” while others looked to § 
13 of the Securities Act.77 
The Supreme Court attempted to settle the disagreement in Lampf, 
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson.78  The Court 
reasoned that “the federal interests in predictability and judicial 
economy” favored the adoption of a uniform statute of limitations for 
actions brought under Rule 10b-5, and, therefore, looked to the 
72. Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODe § 25504.1 (West 
2014). 
73. See supra note 2. 
74. Securities Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2012). 
75. Id. 
76. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 
358 (1991). 
77. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 1559-60. 
78. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 352-64. 
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statutes of limitations in the Securities and Exchange Acts.79  But the 
Court did not adopt the language of § 13 of the Securities Act; instead, 
it borrowed from § 9(e) of the Exchange Act.  The Court held that a 
suit under Rule 10b-5 “must be commenced within one year after the 
discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years 
after such violation.”80  Thus, the new statute of limitations for Rule 
10b-5 differed from the Securities Act statute of limitations in that the 
former did not, by its terms, require “reasonable diligence” on the part 
of the plaintiff.81  Despite this distinction, most circuits after Lampf 
imposed a duty of reasonable diligence on plaintiffs bringing suit 
under Rule 10b-5 by applying the inquiry notice rule.82 
The Tenth and Ninth Circuits recognized the distinction between 
inquiry notice—the point at which “there exists sufficient suspicion of 
fraud to cause a reasonable investor to investigate the matter 
further”83—and the later point at which the plaintiff “in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the facts underlying the 
alleged fraud.”84  The Tenth Circuit noted that “inquiry notice alone 
may not be the determinative factor, at least when a reasonable 
investor could not reasonably have discovered the facts underlying the 
alleged fraud until some time after being placed on inquiry notice.”85  
The Ninth Circuit followed that rationale in adopting the Tenth 
Circuit’s inquiry-plus-reasonable-diligence-test, holding that “[o]nce a 
plaintiff has inquiry notice, we ask when the investor, in the exercise 
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the facts constituting 
79. Id. at 357-58. 
80. Id. at 364. 
81. Section 13 of the Securities Act provides that “[n]o action shall be 
maintained to enforce any liability created under section 77k or 77ll(a)(2) of this 
title unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the 
omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence . . . .”  Securities Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2012) (emphasis 
added).   
82. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 646 (2010) ( “Subsequently, 
every Court of Appeals to decide the matter [post-Lampf] held that ‘discovery of the 
facts constituting the violation’ occurs not only once a plaintiff actually discovers 
the facts, but also when a hypothetical reasonably diligent plaintiff would have 
discovered them.”).  
83. Betz v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 486 F.3d 590, 596 (9th Cir. 2007). 
84. Sterlin v. Biomune Sys., 154 F.3d 1191, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998). 
85. Id. at 1196. 
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the alleged fraud.  The answer to that second question tells us when 
the statute of limitations began to run.”86 
Other circuits’ formulations of inquiry notice imposed a duty of 
reasonable diligence on plaintiffs, and some courts timed the 
limitations period from the date the duty of inquiry arose.  The Sixth 
Circuit held that the statute of limitations was not triggered until a 
reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered facts constituting 
the violation, but that inquiry notice triggered a duty to investigate.87  
Similarly, the First Circuit held that the statute of limitations began to 
run not upon inquiry notice, but upon the later date at which the 
plaintiff, exercising reasonable diligence, would have discovered the 
fraud.88  It employed a burden-shifting formulation of inquiry notice, 
whereby if the defendant met the “initial burden of establishing the 
existence of [storm] warnings,” the plaintiff then bore the burden of 
showing she “fulfilled her corresponding duty of making a reasonably 
diligent inquiry into the possibility of fraudulent activity.”89  The 
Second Circuit’s approach was to time the statute of limitations “two 
different ways, depending on whether the investor undertakes some 
inquiry.”90  The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits held that the statute of 
limitations began to run when the plaintiff was put on inquiry notice, 
and that inquiry notice was triggered by evidence of the mere 
possibility of fraud.91  In summary, Lampf failed to create a uniform 
statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5. 
86. Betz, 486 F.3d at 596. 
87. New Eng. Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 336 
F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir. 2003). 
88. Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002). 
89. Id. at 9. 
90. LC Capital Partners, LP v. Frontier Ins. Group, Inc., 318 F.3d 148, 154 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (“If the investor makes no inquiry once the duty arises, knowledge will be 
imputed as of the date the duty arose.  However, if the investor makes some inquiry 
once the duty arises, we will impute knowledge of what an investor ‘in the exercise 
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered’ concerning the fraud, and in such 
cases the limitations period begins to run from the date such inquiry should have 
revealed the fraud.” (quoting Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 98 (2d Cir. 2000))). 
91. E.g., Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 126 F. App’x. 593, 597 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the statute of limitations “begins to run when the plaintiff is put on 
inquiry notice of the facts constituting the alleged violation,” and that a “plaintiff’s 
awareness of the possibility of fraud, not complete exposure of the fraud, triggers 
inquiry notice.”); Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 1219, 1228 (11th Cir. 2001) 
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In 2002, in the wake of numerous high-profile financial disasters 
such as Enron, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to strengthen 
investor protection.92  Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
increased the statute of limitations for private actions brought pursuant 
to the anti-fraud provisions of federal securities laws to the earlier of 
five years after the act or omission, or two years after discovery of the 
facts constituting the action.93  However, the amendment did not 
clarify which formulation of the inquiry notice standard was correct, 
nor did it address whether inquiry notice was the proper standard at 
all.94 
In 2010, the Supreme Court had the opportunity in Merck & Co., 
Inc. v. Reynolds to settle what “discovery of the facts constituting the 
violation” meant for the purposes of the statute of limitations for 
securities fraud.95  Investors sued pharmaceutical company Merck & 
Co. for securities fraud under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 
(explaining that inquiry notice “‘is triggered by evidence of the possibility of fraud, 
not full exposition of the scam itself,’” but ignoring Sterlin’s second step in holding 
that inquiry notice starts the statute of limitations (quoting Sterlin v. Biomune Sys., 
154 F.3d 1191, 1203 (10th Cir. 1998))), abrogated by Merck & Co., Inc. v. 
Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2010); Brumbaugh v. Princeton Partners, 985 F.2d 157, 
162 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Inquiry notice is triggered by evidence of the possibility of 
fraud, not by complete exposure of the alleged scam.”). 
92. See Cosenza, supra note 31, at 718 n.215.  
93. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 804, 28 U.S.C § 1658(b) (2006) (“[A] private right 
of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in 
contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws . . . may be 
brought not later than the earlier of–(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts 
constituting the violation; or (2) 5 years after such violation.”). 
94. Compare, e.g., Betz v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 519 F.3d 863, 871 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (“The existence of inquiry notice is only the first prong of the two-part 
notice-plus-reasonable-diligence test that we are today adopting, and the second 
stage of that inquiry, the question of whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable 
diligence in investigating the facts underlying the alleged fraud . . . necessarily 
entails an assessment of the plaintiff’s particular circumstances from the perspective 
of a reasonable investor.”), and Shah v. Meeker, 435 F.3d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(if the plaintiff investigates, limitations period begins at “date such inquiry should 
have revealed the fraud,” but if the plaintiff does not investigate, limitations period 
begins upon inquiry notice), with New Eng. Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v. 
Ernst & Young, LLP, 336 F.3d 495, 501 (6th Cir. 2003) (limitations period never 
begins before a reasonably diligent plaintiff, after being placed on inquiry notice, 
would have discovered facts constituting the violation). 
95. Merck & Co., Inc., 559 U.S. at 633.  
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10b-5, alleging that the company knowingly misrepresented the heart-
attack risks associated with its drug Vioxx.96  The district court 
dismissed the case as time barred because the plaintiffs were aware of 
facts that alerted them to a “‘possibility that Merck had knowingly 
misrepresented material facts’” two years and one month before the 
complaint was filed.97  The district court found that those facts put the 
plaintiffs on “inquiry notice,” which they failed to dutifully 
investigate.98  The district court ultimately held the statute of 
limitations began to run at that time and imputed knowledge of the 
“facts constituting the violation” as of the date that the plaintiffs 
should have been aware of the possibility of fraud.99  On appeal, the 
Third Circuit reversed, finding that the events constituting “storm 
warnings” “did not suggest much by way of scienter,”100 which is a 
fact constituting the violation.101 
The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari to resolve the 
disagreements among the courts of appeals regarding the statute of 
limitations.  The Supreme Court rejected inquiry notice as triggering 
the statute of limitations, defining inquiry notice as “the point where 
the facts would lead a reasonably diligent plaintiff to investigate 
further,” because “that point is not necessarily the point at which the 
plaintiff would already have discovered facts showing scienter or 
other ‘facts constituting the violation.’”102  The Court further noted, 
“[n]othing in the text suggests that the limitations period can 
sometimes begin before ‘discovery’ can take place.”103 
96. Id. at 637-38. 
97. Id. at 643 (quoting In re Merck & Co. Securities, Derivative & “ERISA” 
Litigation, 483 F. Supp. 2d 407, 423 (D.N.J. 2007).  
98. Id. (“[P]laintiffs had failed to ‘show that they exercised reasonable due 
diligence but nevertheless were unable to discover their injuries . . . .’” (quoting In 
re Merck & Co., 483 F. Supp. 2d at 423)). 
99. Id. at 642-43. 
100. Scienter means “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”  Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).  However, certain forms of 
recklessness may be considered intentional conduct for purposes of imposing 
liability.  Id. at 193 n.12. 
101. Merck & Co., Inc., 559 U.S. at 643 (citing In re Merck & Co. Securities, 
Derivative & “ERISA” Litigation, 543 F.3d 150, 172 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
102. Id. at 651. 
103. Id. 
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Thus, the Court made clear that the statute of limitations “begins 
to run [at the earlier of] once a plaintiff did discover or a reasonably 
diligent plaintiff would have” discovered enough facts to draft a viable 
complaint.104  While the holding in Merck is limited to federal 
securities laws and is not binding authority with respect to California’s 
anti-fraud provisions, it should be instructive because the pertinent 
language of Corporations Code section 25506 is identical to the statute 
of limitations that the Supreme Court construed in Merck.105 
D. Statutes of Limitations for Private Rights of Action Under 
California Law 
The statute of limitations for the anti-fraud provisions of 
California securities law mirrors the statute of limitations for Rule 
10b-5.  Until 2004, section 25506 provided that an action for 
securities fraud must be brought “before the expiration of four years 
after the act or transaction constituting the violation or the expiration 
of one year after the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts constituting 
the violation, whichever shall first expire.”106  In 2004, the legislature 
amended the statute to extend the limitations period to the earlier of 
five years after the act or two years after discovery of the facts 
constituting the violation.107  The bill’s author, Representative Correa, 
noted that the amendment was needed to “conform California’s statute 
of limitations for securities fraud actions to the federal statute of 
limitations as set by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, so that state law 
is at least as protective of California investors as federal law.”108 
104. Id. at 653. 
105. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
106. Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506 (West 
2014). 
107. A.B. 2167, ch. 575, § 3, 2004 Leg. Serv. (West) (codified as amended at 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506(b)); see also Securities: Corporate Liability: Hearing on 
Assemb. B. 2167 Before the Comm. on Banking and Fin., 2004 Leg., 2003-04 Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2004), available at http://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/03-
04/bill/asm/ab_2151-2200/ab_2167_cfa_20040330_104037_asm_comm.html. 
108. Unlicensed Security Brokers: Hearing on Assemb. B. 2166 Before the S. 
Judiciary Comm., 2004 Leg., 2003-04 Reg. Sess., at 4 (Cal. 2004) (comments of 
Rep. Correa), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_2151-
2200/ab_2167_cfa_20040623_121942_sen_comm.html. 
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The language of the California statute of limitations is now 
identical to Rule 10b-5’s statute of limitations and the clear legislative 
intent was to follow Rule 10b-5.  But several California courts, unlike 
the Supreme Court, have embraced inquiry notice.109  In Deveny v. 
Entropin, Inc., the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District 
held that inquiry notice is sufficient to begin the limitations period 
under section 25506.110 
The facts of Deveny are similar to the facts of Merck, the case in 
which the Supreme Court rejected inquiry notice.111  In Deveny, a 
group of investors sued pharmaceutical company Entropin, Inc. for 
securities fraud under California law, “alleging that [the company] 
fraudulently concealed . . . negative clinical data that revealed [its 
developmental drug] was ineffective.”112  From 1998 until September 
of 2002, Entropin’s filings with the SEC and its press releases 
indicated that clinical trials showed that its developmental drug was 
effective.113  During this period, Entropin “sold shares of common 
stock and warrants to the public.”114  “In September 2002, however, 
Entropin issued a press release stating that its clinical trials had been a 
failure” and that it was “abandoning the drug.”115  Entropin’s 
securities price “collapsed,” and four months later investors filed a 
securities fraud class action, alleging they purchased Entropin’s 
securities in reliance on its misrepresentations about the clinical 
trials.116 
109. Jackson v. Fisher, 931 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Wright 
v. Bloom, No. C 12-00746 WHA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170679, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 30, 2012); Hardisty v. Moore, No. 11cv1591 AJB (BLM), 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 61465, at *13 (S.D. Cal. 2012); Hernandez v. Vasquez, B244533, 2013 Cal. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 8074, at *20-23 (Nov. 7, 2013); Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 42 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 807 (Ct. App. 2006).   
110. Id.  Though the case was decided in 2006, the alleged violations occurred 
before 2002.  Id. at 811-12.  Thus, the court did not address the 2004 amendment to 
Section 25506 (which applies only to violations occurring on or after January 1, 
2005).  CORP. CODE §25506. 
111. Deveny, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 810-12. 
112. Id. at 812-13. 
113. Id. at 811-12. 
114. Id. at 811. 
115. Id. at 812. 
116. Id.  
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Entropin moved for summary judgment on the ground that the 
action was untimely.117  Entropin cited blood and urine data, which 
was available on its website more than a year before the plaintiffs filed 
their complaint, arguing that the data indicated that the developmental 
drug was ineffective.118  The trial court granted the motion for 
summary judgment, holding that the availability of the data on the 
website put the investors on inquiry notice beyond the statutory 
period, and the investors appealed.119 
The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District reversed 
the lower court’s decision, but rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that 
actual notice, rather than inquiry notice, was the correct standard.120  
The court held that inquiry notice is sufficient to trigger the running of 
the limitations period under section 25506,121 but reversed only 
because it found that the blood and urine data on the website could 
not, as a matter of law, establish inquiry notice.122 
The Supreme Court may have laid to rest the knotty concept of 
inquiry notice in Merck, but inquiry notice is alive and well in 
California, where Deveny is still cited as good law.123  The result of 
this inconsistency is that California law is less protective of investors 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 813. 
119. Id. at 814-15. 
120. Id. at 817.  
121. Id.  
122. Id. at 823-24.  
123. E.g., Jackson v. Fisher, 931 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 
(motion to dismiss securities fraud claim under California law granted based on 
statute of limitations, with leave to amend, though plaintiff alleged that she 
discovered the fraud less than two years before the complaint was filed); Wright v. 
Bloom, No. C 12-00746 WHA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170679, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 30, 2012) (“Inquiry notice is triggered when a person becomes aware of 
financial, legal, or other information that suggests (to an investor of reasonable 
intelligence) that he or she had been defrauded.”); Hardisty v. Moore, No. 11cv1591 
AJB (BLM), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61465, at *13 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (“The statute of 
limitations provided under Section 25506 is subject to the inquiry notice rule.”); 
Hernandez v. Vasquez, B244533, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8074, at *20-23 
(Nov. 7, 2013) (holding that inquiry notice is sufficient to trigger the statute of 
limitations, and that while inquiry notice is generally an issue of fact, it may be 
established as a matter of law where the “underlying facts are undisputed and 
subject to only one reasonable” interpretation). 
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than federal law, which is directly contrary to the stated purpose of the 
2004 amendment to section 25506.124 
IV. CALIFORNIA SHOULD REJECT INQUIRY NOTICE 
The rationale supporting the Supreme Court’s holding in Merck 
applies with equal force to Corporations Code section 25506, but stare 
decisis commands that California lower courts follow Deveny.125  But 
precedent need not be respected when “adherence to it puts us on a 
course that is sure error.”126  Moreover, when a prior decision is not 
well reasoned and is unworkable, a court may overrule it.127  Deveny 
was not well reasoned because it ignored the maxim that “a statute’s 
plain meaning should be given priority in its construction.”128  
Furthermore, Deveny contradicts the legislative intent of the 2004 
amendment to section 25506.129  Finally, the unjust consequences of 
inquiry notice make Deveny’s holding unworkable, especially in light 
of the recent amendment to section 25401, which imposes judicially-
created elements on a securities fraud claim.130 
A. Deveny Was Not Well Reasoned 
In Deveny, the court conspicuously ignored crucial distinctions in 
the statutory language of section 25506 and § 13 of the Securities Act.  
In holding that inquiry notice was sufficient to start the limitations 
period for securities fraud under California law, the court noted that 
124. See supra note 108.  
125. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“Stare decisis is the 
preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent 
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”).  
126. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010). 
127. Id. at 362-63 (citing Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 779 (2009)); 
see also Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (“[Despite the importance of stare decisis,] when 
governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned” courts are not 
constrained to follow precedent.).   
128. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 665 F.2d 1126, 1137 
(D.C. Cir. 1981).  “[The maxim] is the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation.”  Id. 
at n.21. 
129. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
130. See discussion supra Part IV.C-D. 
                                                          
21
Güner: The Securities Fraud Victim's Dilemma: Why California Should Reje
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2013
Guner.docx (Do Not Delete) 7/2/2014  12:42 PM 
308 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
federal courts had held the same, including in Kramas v. Security Gas 
& Oil, Inc.131  The court in Kramas, however, failed to offer any 
support for its proposition that inquiry notice triggers the limitations 
period under section 25506.132  The court simply stated that “[t]he 
limitations period under 15 U.S.C. § 77m [§ 13 of the Securities Act] 
does not begin to run until plaintiff discovers the facts constituting the 
violation or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered them,” and that “[t]he same principle applies . . . in view of 
the similarity in language, we think also under [section 25506 of the 
California Corporations Code].”133  The fatal flaw in this logic is that 
the language of section 25506 is different from the language of § 13 of 
the Securities Act: section 25506 does not say “in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence.”134  This distinction is critical because while § 
13 of the Securities Act arguably incorporates inquiry notice by its 
terms, section 25506 certainly does not.135  Thus, Deveny erroneously 
treated § 13 of the Securities Act and section 25506 the same. 
The Deveny court declined to follow a prior California court of 
appeal decision in Eisenbaum that rejected inquiry notice under 
section 25507–the statute of limitations for actions alleging failure to 
qualify a securities transaction in California.136  In Eisenbaum, the 
court held that the statute of limitations under section 25507 
commences upon actual discovery of the facts underlying the elements 
of the violation, not upon inquiry notice.137  The Eisenbaum court 
aimed its primary focus at the language of the statute, noting, “[b]y its 
plain language, the statute requires actual knowledge, not just ‘inquiry 
131. Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 815 (Ct. App. 2006); 
Kramas v Security Gas & Oil Inc., 672 F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir. 1982). 
132. Kramas, 672 F.2d 766. 
133. Id. at 770. 
134. Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506(b) (West 
2014). 
135. Some argue that the “reasonable diligence” language expresses a 
constructive discovery standard, not an inquiry notice standard, and in the absence 
of such language, the statute should be read as requiring actual discovery of the facts 
constituting the violation.  See Cosenza, supra note 35, at 727-32. 
136. Deveny, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 810. 
137. Eisenbaum v. W. Energy Res., Inc., 267 Cal. Rptr. 5, 11-12 (Ct. App. 
1990). 
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notice.’”138  The court further supported its conclusion by contrasting 
the language of section 25507 with that of section 25506.1, which 
establishes the “statute of limitations for fraud liability imposed upon 
those who ‘expertise’ a prospectus.”139  Under section 25506.1, the 
statute of limitations begins to run one year “after such discovery 
should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”140  
The court recognized “the significant and controlling distinction in the 
statutory language.”141 
The Deveny court’s refusal to give the Eisenbaum decision any 
weight is difficult to reconcile given that the exact same “significant 
and controlling distinction in the statutory language”142 is present in 
section 25506.143  The Deveny court distinguished Eisenbaum on the 
basis of the fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant in Eisenbaum.144  But the court in Eisenbaum said, “the 
lack of a fiduciary relationship . . . would not be decisive on the 
statute of limitations issue.”145  Therefore, the rationale employed by 
the Eisenbaum court is equally persuasive as applied to section 25506, 
and the court in Deveny should have followed Eisenbaum. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 12. 
140. Id. (citing Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506.1 
(West 2014)). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Section 25507 says that actions must be “brought before the expiration 
of . . . one year after the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts constituting such 
violation.”  Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25507 (West 
2014).  Section 25506, subdivision b, says that actions must be “brought before the 
expiration of . . . two years after the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts 
constituting the violation.”  Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 
25506(b) (West 2014).  Section 25506.1, on the other hand, says that actions must 
be “brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the 
violation, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence.”  Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 
25506.1 (West 2014) (emphasis added). 
144. Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 816-17 (Ct. App. 2006).  
145. Eisenbaum, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 11. 
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B. The Textualist Interpretation of Section 25506 
Given that Deveny was not well-reasoned, it should be overruled 
and section 25506 should be interpreted without regard to Deveny’s 
holding.  “‘The starting point in every case involving construction of a 
statute is the language itself.’”146  “A basic canon of statutory 
construction is that words should be interpreted as taking their 
ordinary and plain meaning.”147  Section 25506 provides that an 
action for securities fraud must be brought “before the expiration of 
five years after the act or transaction constituting the violation or the 
expiration of two years after the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts 
constituting the violation, whichever shall first expire.”148  The 
ordinary and plain meaning of “facts constituting the violation” is 
facts corresponding to each element of the violation.149  Inquiry 
notice—the point at which facts suggest wrongdoing and would lead a 
reasonably diligent investor to investigate further—is not necessarily 
the point at which the plaintiff would have already discovered the 
“facts constituting the violation.”150  Thus, inquiry notice is 
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the text of section 25506. 
Another canon of statutory interpretation is that “words undefined 
in a statute are to be interpreted and applied according to their 
common-law meanings.”151  At common law, “discovery” of a cause 
of action occurs not only when the plaintiff has actual knowledge of 
the facts underlying the claim, but also when the plaintiff has reason 
146. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. 
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 
421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
147. United States v. Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. Unit B Feb. 
1981). 
148. Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506(b) (West 
2014). 
149. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 648 (2010) (“Scienter 
is assuredly a ‘fact.’. . . And this ‘fact’ of scienter ‘constitut[es]’ an important and 
necessary element of a § 10(b) ‘violation.’” (alteration in original)). 
150. Id. at 651.  For example, in Wright v. Bloom, the plaintiffs realized they 
had been defrauded several months before they even became aware that they had 
participated in a securities offering.  Wright v. Bloom, No. C 12-00746 WHA, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170679, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012). 
151. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 320 (2012). 
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to suspect a factual basis for the action.152  The court in Deveny noted 
that section 338, subdivision (d), of the California Code of Civil 
Procedure, which requires that an action for common law fraud be 
asserted within three years of discovery of the facts constituting the 
fraud, states that the limitations period begins to run upon discovery of 
facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to suspect fraud.153  
The court concluded that inquiry notice is consistent with the common 
law understanding of the term “discovery” in statutes of limitations.154 
But statutes are not interpreted in isolation.155  Read in context, 
“discovery” here cannot implicate inquiry notice.156  The presumption 
of consistent usage reveals that section 25506 does not require 
reasonable diligence on the part of the plaintiff.157  When a statute 
contains a provision, the omission of that provision in another statute 
concerning the same subject matter cannot be ignored.158  As the court 
noted in Eisenbaum, section 25506.1, which establishes the limitations 
period for fraud claims against those who “expertise” a prospectus, 
requires that claims be brought “within one year after the discovery of 
the facts constituting the violation, or after such discovery should 
have been made by reasonable diligence.”159  The fact that section 
25506 omits the “reasonable diligence” clause is significant, 
especially given that section 25506.1 immediately follows section 
152. 43 CAL. JUR. 3D Limitation of Actions § 34 (2011). 
153. Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 816 (Ct. App. 2006). 
154. Id. 
155. Lungren v. Deukmejian, 755 P.2d 299, 304 (Cal. 1988) (“The meaning of 
a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be 
construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be 
harmonized to the extent possible.”). 
156. See Merck & Co., Inc., 559 U.S. at 656 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
157. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 151, at 170-73. 
158. People v. Kuhn, 31 Cal. Rptr. 253, 256 (Ct. App. 1963) (“Where a 
statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of 
such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to 
show that a different intention existed.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
People ex rel. Paganini v. Town of Corte Madera, 218 P.2d 810, 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1950))). 
159. Corporate Securities Law of 1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506.1 (West 
2014) (emphasis added). 
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25506.160  Thus, properly interpreted, section 25506 requires the 
plaintiff to have discovered the facts constituting the violation before 
the limitations period begins to run.161 
Moreover, the presumption against surplusage supports 
distinguishing sections 25506 and 25506.1.162  If the term “discovery” 
in section 25506 implicates inquiry notice, the phrase “or after 
discovery should have been made by reasonable diligence” in section 
25506.1 is rendered meaningless.163  Such an interpretation violates 
the rules that “significance should be given to every word and phrase 
of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose,”164 and that “‘[every] 
statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law 
of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have 
effect.’”165 
C. The Intent-Based Interpretation of Section 25506 
The Deveny court emphasized the court’s focus on legislative 
intent when interpreting statutes.166  A true interpreter, in seeking the 
160. See SCALIA AND GARNER, supra note 151, at 173 (“[T]he more 
connection the cited statute has with the statute under consideration, the more 
plausible the argument becomes.  If it was enacted at the same time, and dealt with 
the same subject, the argument could even be persuasive.”). 
161. Cf. Eisenbaum v. W. Energy Res., Inc., 267 Cal. Rptr. 5, 11 (Ct. App. 
1990). 
162. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 59 Cal. Rptr. 902, 904 (Ct. App. 1967) 
(“In statutory construction there is a presumption against surplusage and in favor of 
a meaning for all parts . . . .”). 
163. Cf. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 656 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (noting that “discovery” in 15 U.S.C. § 77m “cannot mean constructive 
discovery, since that would render superfluous the phrase ‘or after such discovery 
should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence’”). 
164. Buchwald v. Superior Court of S.F., 62 Cal. Rptr. 364, 369 (Ct. App. 
1967) (citing Select Base Materials v. Board of Equalization, 335 P.2d 672, 675-76 
(Cal. 1959)). 
165. Rees v. Layton, 86 Cal. Rptr. 268, 272 (Ct. App. 1970) (quoting Stafford 
v. Realty Bond Service Corp., 249 P.2d 241, 245-56 (Cal. 1952)). 
166. See Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 815-16 (Ct. App. 
2006) (“‘Our function . . . is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to 
effectuate the purpose of the law. . . . In general, the legislative purpose behind such 
statutes is to prevent plaintiffs from asserting stale claims.  At the same time, public 
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legislative intent, would look only to the words of the statute to glean 
the legislative intent, because the legislature chose those words to 
carry out its purpose.167  Courts and advocates often seek the 
legislative intent by looking beyond the words of the statute and 
considering the context in which it was enacted.168  And in doing so 
here, the same conclusion is reached as the one reached in Part B, 
supra.  Even if one were to seek the legislative intent by looking 
beyond the text and considering the context in which section 25506 
was enacted, one would have to conclude that inquiry notice should be 
rejected. 
Section 25506, as amended in 2004, is virtually identical to 28 
U.S.C. § 1658(b).169  “[W]here provisions in the federal and state laws 
are identical and similar in language federal interpretations are 
persuasive in determining how the state law is to be applied.”170  
Under this rationale, the Supreme Court’s rejection of inquiry notice 
in Merck should apply to section 25506.  Even more persuasive, the 
California legislature intentionally copied the federal statute when it 
policy favors the resolution of claims on the merits.’” (quoting Debro v. L.A. 
Raiders, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 335 (Ct. App. 2001))). 
167. See Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 486 U.S. 663, 672 (1988). 
168. See, e.g., United States v. Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. Unit 
B Feb. 1981) (“[C]onsideration of legislative history is proper in determination of 
the meaning of words used in statutes, even where the meaning of the words appears 
to be plain.”); Hope v. Contractors’ State License Bd., 39 Cal. Rptr. 514, 518 (Ct. 
App. 1964) (noting that a court “may look to legislative committee reports as 
extrinsic aid in the interpretation of the legislative purpose in the enactment of a 
statute”); Kelly v. Kane, 94 P.2d 384, 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939) (“[A] statute should 
be construed in the light of the history of the times and the conditions which 
prompted its enactment.”). 
169. Section 25506, as amended in 2004, allows actions to be brought “before 
the expiration of five years after the act or transaction constituting the violation or 
the expiration of two years after the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts 
constituting the violation, whichever shall first expire.”  Corporate Securities Law of 
1968, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506(b) (West 2014).  Under Sarbanes-Oxley, a private 
right of action for a claim of fraud under the federal securities laws “may be brought 
not later than the earlier of— (1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting 
the violation; or (2) 5 years after such violation.”  Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 804, 28 
U.S.C. § 1658(b). 
170. Coast Oyster Co. v. Perluss, 32 Cal. Rptr. 740, 743 (Ct. App. 1963). 
                                                          
27
Güner: The Securities Fraud Victim's Dilemma: Why California Should Reje
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2013
Guner.docx (Do Not Delete) 7/2/2014  12:42 PM 
314 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
amended section 25506.171  The California Senate Judiciary 
Committee noted that under Sarbanes-Oxley, “a private right of action 
for claims of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in 
contravention of a securities regulation may be brought not later than 
the earlier of two years after the discovery of the facts constituting the 
violation or five years after such violation.”172  The legislature’s stated 
purpose in amending section 25506 was to “conform California’s 
statute of limitations for securities fraud actions to the federal statute 
of limitations as set by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, so that state 
law is at least as protective of California investors as federal law.”173 
On the surface, it seems strange that the legislature was concerned 
with conforming California’s securities fraud statute of limitations to 
the Exchange Act statute of limitations because section 25401 was 
modeled after the Securities Act, not the Exchange Act.174  Perhaps 
the legislature believed that Sarbanes-Oxley’s extended statute of 
limitations applied to claims under both Acts.175  It is also possible 
that the legislature recognized that while section 25401 mirrored § 
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, the statute of limitations set forth in 
section 25506 tracked the language of § 9(e) of the Exchange Act.176  
171. Unlicensed Securities Brokers: Hearing on A.B. 2167 Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. 3 (Cal. 2004), available at 
ftp://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_2151-2200/ab_2167_cfa_ 
20040623_121942_sen_comm.html.   
172. Id. at 4. 
173. Id. at 4. 
174. See supra Part III.B. 
175. This would not be an unreasonable assumption, because, although section 
804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act specifically refers to the Exchange Act, (“a private 
right of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in 
contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws, as defined 
in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”), at least one court has 
held that the Supreme Court’s holding in Merck, which interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 
1658(b), applies to § 13 of the Securities Act.  See Pension Trust Fund for Operat’g 
Eng’rs v. Mortg. Asset Securitization Transactions, Inc., 730 F.3d 263, 273 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
176. Subsection (e) of § 9 of the Exchange Act was redesignated as subsection 
(f) in 2010.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 929X(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  It requires that actions for 
manipulation of security prices under § 9 of the Exchange Act be “brought within 
one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation.”  Exchange Act § 
9(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f) (2010). 
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Either way, the legislature made clear that its priority was to ensure 
that state law would be at least as protective of California investors as 
federal law.177 
Inquiry notice frustrates that purpose because it discourages 
investors from filing meritorious claims and prevents fraud suits from 
being decided on the merits.178  It follows that rejecting inquiry notice 
in favor of a discovery-based standard will protect investors by 
encouraging plaintiffs to seek redress on behalf of themselves and 
similarly situated aggrieved investors.  Therefore, because the 
California legislature intended to enhance investor protection when it 
amended the statute of limitations to conform to § 1658(b), the 
Supreme Court’s rejection of inquiry notice for § 1658(b) should 
extend to California’s statute of limitations. 
D. Unjust Consequences of Inquiry Notice 
The unjust consequences of inquiry notice provide another 
justification for overruling Deveny.  First, inquiry notice unfairly 
rewards fraudsters who succeed in concealing their fraudulent 
schemes.179  Second, inquiry notice deters securities fraud victims 
from seeking redress, which subverts the policies behind private 
enforcement of securities laws.180  Third, the recent amendment of 
section 25401 will make it even more difficult for plaintiffs to plead 
securities fraud sufficiently, so a statute of limitations that allows 
plaintiffs enough time to gather facts is now more important than 
ever.181 
177. Unlicensed Securities Brokers: Hearing on A.B. 2167 Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. 4 (Cal. 2004), available at 
ftp://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_2151-2200/ab_2167_cfa_ 
20040623_ 121942_sen_comm.html.   
178. See discussion infra Part IV.D.2. 
179. See discussion infra Part IV.D.1. 
180. See discussion infra Part IV.D.2. 
181. See discussion infra Part IV.D.3. 
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1. Inquiry Notice Unfairly Rewards Fraudsters 
Inquiry notice increases the likelihood that securities fraud 
victims, by no fault of their own, will lose any chance of recovery.182  
An example of how promoters can mask their fraud long enough to 
afford the absolute protection of inquiry notice is the use of “self-
directed IRAs.”183  This type of scam involves convincing investors to 
move assets into a self-directed IRA supposedly held by a custodian 
but which is actually created and owned by the fraudster.184  This type 
of fraud is appealing to a scam artist because the “financial penalty for 
early withdrawal may cause investors to be more passive or to keep 
funds in a fraudulent scheme longer.”185 
Affinity fraud is another example of how fraudsters can employ 
cunning devices to prevent their victims from filing suit before the 
statute of limitations expires.  Affinity fraud occurs when fraudsters 
exploit members of a particular group by professing to be a member of 
that same group.186  Fraudsters market their schemes to group 
members who are more willing to “trust someone who is perceived to 
have a common interest, beliefs or background.”187  Victims of 
affinity fraud are less likely to suspect that they have been defrauded 
because “[m]embers of the group often find it hard to believe that ‘one 
of their own’ could be scamming them.”188  Inquiry notice, though, 
gives rise to a duty of inquiry “when the circumstances would suggest 
to an investor of ordinary intelligence the probability that she has been 
defrauded.”189 
These two examples illustrate that inquiry notice rewards 
fraudsters who use cunning methods to ensure that their victims will 
not take affirmative steps to discover the fraud.  Victims of these types 
182. See, e.g., Wright v. Bloom, Wright v. Bloom, No. C 12-00746, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 170679 WHA, at *8-10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012) 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 170679, *10 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing securities fraud claim because 
plaintiffs were on inquiry notice more than two years before filing their claim). 
183. Top Investor Threats, supra note 28. 
184. Id. 
185. Id.  
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 822 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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of schemes are also victims of inquiry notice.  When they eventually 
do discover the fraud, their inability to see the early warning signs of 
fraud (the “storm warnings”) bars their meritorious claims and 
eliminates their chance of recovery. 
2. Inquiry Notice Deters Securities Fraud Victims  
From Seeking Redress 
The Fourth Circuit stated that inquiry notice encourages plaintiffs 
to take “the actions necessary to bring the fraud to light” and gives a 
defendant the “security of knowing when legal action against him has 
been foreclosed.”190  However, these justifications erroneously 
assume that aggrieved investors are not already sufficiently 
incentivized to promptly file suit.191  Courts have also suggested that 
inquiry notice is essential to prevent investors from taking unfair 
advantage of the protections of the securities laws by postponing 
action on an alleged fraud, pending the outcome of their 
investments.192  But the assumption that securities fraud victims who 
are aware of the fraud wait to file suit is misguided because “[i]t is 
more likely that plaintiffs [do] not know about the fraud, rather than 
that they [sit] on their hands with the information.”193  Moreover, the 
strict pleading requirements for fraud “strongly discourage private 
plaintiffs from bringing marginal suits.”194 
190. Brumbaugh v. Princeton Partners, 985 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1993). 
191. Securities fraud plaintiffs are already highly motivated to investigate and 
file their claims as soon as possible for several reasons.  See Kaufman & 
Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 1589-90 (noting several motivating factors, such as 
the presence of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs encouraging plaintiffs to 
investigate and file because these institutional investors often have sufficient 
resources to conduct their own prefiling investigation; filing early correlates with a 
stronger likelihood of surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss; and any delay 
comes at the cost of increased unavailability of evidence). 
192. See Brumbaugh, 985 F.2d at 162 (“In sum, plaintiffs should not be able to 
coerce settlements simply because aging has improved an originally meritless 
claim . . . .”); Tregenza v. Great American Commc’ns Co., 12 F.3d 717, 722 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (“These plaintiffs waited patiently to sue.  If the stock rebounded from 
the cellar they would have investment profits, and if it stayed in the cellar they 
would have legal damages.  Heads I win, tails you lose.  This tactic is discouraged 
by the doctrine of inquiry notice.”). 
193. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 1594. 
194. Rose, supra note 29, at 2220. 
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The uncertainty regarding whether the statute of limitations will 
bar a potential plaintiff’s claim can prove costly because inquiry 
notice is generally an issue left to the finder of fact.195  Even where a 
plaintiff has a strong case for fraud, the plaintiff must weigh the 
significant cost of pursuing litigation, starting from pre-discovery 
through trial, against the possibility that the plaintiff may lose at trial 
based on the statute of limitations.  Thus, inquiry notice reduces a 
fraud victim’s incentive to pursue redress and reduces the chance that 
cases will be decided on the merits of the claim. 
The SEC recently implemented § 201(a) of the Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups Act by lifting the 80-year ban on general solicitation 
for private securities offerings.196  Now, certain types of investment 
schemes can be advertised on billboards, through the Internet, and 
other media.197  States are the primary regulator of private 
offerings,198 and state regulators predict that lifting the ban on general 
solicitation will lead to more enforcement actions.199  State regulators 
will not have the resources necessary to handle the sudden wave of 
fraud perpetrated through general solicitation, leaving aggrieved 
investors to rely on private actions to seek redress.200  The importance 
of private enforcement of the securities laws on the overall economy 
will become even more pronounced.201  If fraudsters are not deterred 
by private enforcement, securities fraud will become more prevalent, 
and state regulators will become even more overwhelmed in their 
efforts to protect investors.202  In light of the increased importance of 
195. Hernandez v. Vasquez, No. B244533, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
8074, at *22 (Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2013). 
196. 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, & 242 (2013). 
197. Id. 
198. ABSHURE, supra note 26, at 2-3. 
199. Id. at 4. 
200. Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, SEC, Outmanned and Outgunned: 
Fighting on Behalf of Investors Despite Efforts to Weaken Investor Protections, 
Address at the North American Securities Administrators Association Annual 
NASAA/SEC 19(d) Conference (April 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515400#P55_10421. 
201. See discussion supra Part II. 
202. In his speech explaining why he voted against the proposal eliminating 
the prohibition on general solicitation, Commissioner Aguilar noted that “it is now 
more important than ever that defrauded investors have the ability to seek redress 
against those who participate in defrauding them.”  Aguilar, supra note 200.  He 
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private rights of action for securities fraud, California should reject 
inquiry notice because it discourages investors from filing meritorious 
securities fraud claims. 
3. California’s Amended Securities Fraud Statute 
The recent remodeling of the anti-fraud provision of California 
securities law conforms it to SEC Rule 10b-5.203  If California courts 
interpret the amended law consistently with how federal courts have 
interpreted the now virtually identical Rule 10b-5, aggrieved investors 
will now face even more overwhelming pleading hurdles,204 because 
plaintiffs bringing suit under Rule 10b-5 must plead judicially 
imposed elements—scienter, reliance, and causation—which have 
never before been required under California securities law.205  The 
California legislature has asserted that the purpose of the amendment 
was “to ensure consistency with more comprehensive, federal anti-
fraud statutes.”206  Thus, the legislative history evidences an intent to 
adopt Rule 10b-5, including the judicially-imposed elements.207 
also stated that: “Private actions give fraud victims the ability to recover their losses.  
It is unrealistic to expect that state regulators or the SEC will have the resources to 
police all securities frauds or go after every fraudster.  Investors should have the 
ability to protect themselves.” Id.  
203. See supra note 2. 
204. Mugmon et al., supra note 3.  Defense attorneys will certainly advocate 
for a Rule 10b-5 pleading standard, and it is likely that courts will read the 10b-5 
elements into the amended statutes given that “by amending an unambiguous statute 
the Legislature may be assumed to have intended to change the existing law.”  
Gaumer v. County of Tehama, 55 Cal. Rptr. 777, 778 (Ct. App. 1967) (citing Cal. 
Motor Transp. Co. v. Pub. Utilit. Comm’n., 379 P.2d 324, 326-27 (Cal. 1963)); see 
also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Geyer, 55 Cal. Rptr. 861, 867 (Ct. App. 1967) (“It is a 
settled principle of statutory construction that a material change in the phraseology 
of a legislative enactment is ordinarily viewed as showing an intention on the part of 
the Legislature to change the meaning of the statute.”). 
205. Brown, supra note 4.   
206. S.B. 538 Bill Analysis, Assemb. Comm. on Banking and Fin. (June 10, 
2013), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0501-0550/sb_538_cfa_ 
20130607_121212_asm_comm.html. 
207. Keith Paul Bishop, Die Verwandlung: How the Legislature Likely Raised 
the Bar on Securities Fraud Actions, CALIFORNIA CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW 
BLOG (Sept. 30, 2013), http://calcorporatelaw.com/2013/09/die-verwandlung-how-
the-legislature-likely-raised-the-bar-on-securities-fraud-actions/.  
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In California, the “facts constituting the fraud . . . must be alleged 
factually and specifically.”208  Moreover, in securities fraud claims, 
the court accepts as true only “properly pleaded” material facts, not 
“contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.”209  But if, as 
Deveny holds, circumstances suggesting the mere possibility of fraud 
are sufficient to trigger the running of the limitations period,210 a 
securities fraud victim could easily run out of time to file his claim 
before he can gather enough facts through pre-discovery investigation 
to draft a complaint that meets the heightened pleading standard.  
After all, “‘[c]oncealment is inherent in most securities fraud cases,’” 
and “extensive and corrupt schemes may not be discovered within” 
the limitations period.211 
The requirement of scienter itself creates a “pleading trap” for 
plaintiffs.212  Scienter is likely more difficult to discover than the other 
elements of fraud.213  Uncovering evidence of a defendant’s mental 
state in a pre-discovery investigation is a formidable task.214  Plaintiffs 
may only point to facts suggestive of scienter that are available within 
208. Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 199, 210 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Comm. on 
Children’s Telev., Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 672 (Cal. 1983)). 
209. Moss v. Kroner, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 220, 225 (Ct. App. 2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Blank v. Kirwan, 703 P.2d 58, 61 (Cal. 1985)). 
210. Deveny v. Entropin, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 817 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(“Inquiry notice is sufficient to trigger the running of the limitations period . . . .”).  
“Inquiry notice arises in a securities action when circumstances suggest to an 
investor of ordinary intelligence the possibility that he has been defrauded.”  Id. at 
821. 
211. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 
377 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing against the three-year statute of 
repose). 
212. For further discussion of this dilemma facing plaintiffs even after 
Merck’s rejection of inquiry notice, see Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 
1581-86. 
213. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 657-58 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“Determining when the plaintiff should have uncovered an untrue 
assertion in a registration statement or prospectus is much simpler than assessing 
when a plaintiff should have learned that the defendant deliberately misled him 
using a deceptive device . . . ..”). 
214. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 33, at 1578-79. 
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the two-year window, or their action may be dismissed based on the 
statute of limitations.215 
Another reason California should reject inquiry notice is that with 
the reworking of the anti-fraud provision, the justification for a 
shortened statute of limitations is gone.  The legislature created a 
statute of limitations for securities fraud shorter than that available 
under common law fraud because the anti-fraud provisions of the 
Corporate Securities Law of 1968 relieved victims of establishing 
some of the elements of common law fraud.216  But the judicially-
imposed elements of Rule 10b-5 closely resemble the elements of 
common law fraud.217  Keeping the truncated inquiry notice statute of 
limitations, while still requiring plaintiffs to essentially plead common 
law fraud, would frustrate the purpose of the anti-fraud provisions of 
the securities laws.  Congress has recognized that: 
[p]rivate securities litigation is an indispensable tool with which 
defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely 
upon government action.  Such private lawsuits promote public and 
global confidence in our capital markets and help to deter 
wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, 
directors, lawyers and others properly perform their jobs.218 
Inquiry notice, though, prevents defrauded investors from bringing 
meritorious suits.219 
One could argue that because California’s anti-fraud provision 
was originally modeled after § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, the 
Supreme Court’s rejection of inquiry notice for the Exchange Act’s 
statute of limitations has no bearing on section 25506, notwithstanding 
the recent amendment to section 25401.  However, whether inquiry 
notice is sufficient to start the limitations period for actions brought 
under the Securities Act has been called into question since Merck.  
The Third Circuit recently rejected inquiry notice in favor of a 
215. Id. at 1581-86.  
216. Bowden v. Robinson, 136 Cal. Rptr. 871, 879 (Ct. App. 1977).  
217. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 
377 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
218. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-104hrpt369/pdf/CRPT-104hrpt369.pdf. 
219. See discussion supra Part IV.D.2. 
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discovery-based standard for securities fraud claims brought under the 
Securities Act, holding that Merck’s rejection of inquiry notice is not 
limited to the Exchange Act.220  The court’s well-reasoned opinion 
rests on four grounds.  First, both the Exchange Act’s statute of 
limitations (28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)) and the Securities Act’s statute of 
limitations (§ 13) “incorporate the word ‘discovery’ which . . . [is] a 
term of art representing the discovery rule.”221  Second, while the 
latter statute references “‘the exercise of due diligence’ . . . . [n]either 
statute includes any language suggesting that the limitations period 
begins to run before discovery.”222  Third, the court noted that the 
Supreme Court has treated both statutes of limitations as 
“interchangeable.”223 
Finally, the Third Circuit critically analyzed the purpose of the 
limitations period, and concluded that inquiry notice is inconsistent 
with that purpose.224  “[I]t is logical to link the statute of limitations 
standard with the pleading standard; the purpose of statutes of 
limitations is to prevent stale claims, but claims cannot be stale until 
they have accrued, and claims cannot accrue until they can be 
adequately pled.”225  The court thus concluded that a plaintiff cannot 
be “‘deemed’” to have “‘discovered’” facts constituting the violation 
for the purposes of beginning the limitations period “‘until a 
reasonably diligent plaintiff would have sufficient information about 
that fact to adequately it in a complaint . . . with sufficient detail and 
particularity to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.’”226 
Like federal securities fraud claims, securities fraud claims under 
California law must meet heightened pleading standards.227  
220. Pension Trust Fund for Operat’g Eng’rs v. Mortg. Asset Securitization 
Transactions, Inc., 730 F.3d 263, 273 (3d Cir. 2013). 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 275. 
225. Id.  
226. Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting  City of Pontiac Gen. Empl. Ret. Sys. V. 
MBIA, Inc., 637 F.d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
227. Olenicoff v. UBS AG, No. SACV 08-1029 AG (RNBx), 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14056, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2009) (claim for securities fraud under 
California Corporations Code sections 25401 and 25501 dismissed because 
plaintiffs failed “to meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).”). 
                                                          
36
California Western Law Review, Vol. 50 [2013], No. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol50/iss2/4
Guner.docx (Do Not Delete) 7/2/2014  12:42 PM 
2014] THE SECURITIES FRAUD VICTIM’S DILEMMA 323 
Moreover, the importance of private actions under the federal 
securities laws applies with equal force to state securities laws.228  
Therefore, the policies articulated by the Third Circuit which support 
extending Merck’s holding to claims under both the Securities and 
Exchange Acts also support extending Merck’s holding to the 
securities fraud claims under California law, even if the judicially-
imposed elements of Rule 10b-5 are not grafted onto section 25401. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of a statute of limitations is to prevent stale claims 
from being brought, but under inquiry notice, a claim may be deemed 
“stale” before it even accrues.  This is both illogical and unfair.  The 
inquiry notice standard has no place in section 25506 because the 
imposition of a duty of inquiry conflicts with the text of the statute.  
Inquiry notice made its way into California securities law during the 
befuddling era before a discreet statute of limitations applied to causes 
of action under Rule 10b-5.  Its unquestioned reign continues only 
because courts have not critically analyzed the California court of 
appeal’s holding in Deveny. 
Private enforcement plays a crucial role in the deterrence-based 
scheme of securities regulation.  But the policies underlying the rights 
of aggrieved investors to bring private actions against perpetrators of 
securities fraud are frustrated by a limitations period that may expire 
before the investors can adequately plead each element of securities 
fraud.  In light of the California legislature’s reformation of the anti-
fraud provision, which will likely require plaintiffs to plead and prove 
reliance, causation, and scienter, it is more crucial than ever that 
California reject inquiry notice. 
 
Shauna C. Güner* 
228. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-104hrpt369/pdf/CRPT-104hrpt369.pdf. 
           *   J.D. Candidate, California Western School of Law, 2015.  I would like to 
thank Michael Aguirre, Maria Severson, and Professor Ruth Hargrove. 
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